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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Although the district court found, "The entire encounter was a fishing expedition," the
court nonetheless denied Adam Andrew Nelson's motion to suppress. (See R., p.68.) On appeal,
Mr. Nelson asserts the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. Contrary to the
district court's determination that there was a consensual encounter, under the circumstances
here, officers seized Mr. Nelson at the start of their interaction with him, before they learned he
was on parole. Reasonable articulable suspicion did not support the officers' warrantless seizure
ofMr. Nelson, and the evidence obtained as a result of the unlawful seizure must be suppressed.
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argues that Mr. Nelson has not shown that the district
court erred by denying his motion to suppress, claiming the court correctly found that the
conversation Mr. Nelson had with the officers before they learned he was on parole was a
consensual encounter. (See Resp. Br., p.5.) This Reply Brief is necessary to explain that the
State's argument improperly addresses the relevant circumstances individually, rather than
examine all of the circumstances surrounding the incident.

An examination of all the

circumstances demonstrates that a reasonable person in Mr. Nelson's situation would have
believed he was not free to leave.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Nelson's Appellant's Brief

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Nelson's motion to suppress?

2

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Nelson's Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Mr. Nelson asserts the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. As

discussed above, the district court found, "The entire encounter was a fishing expedition."
(R., p.68.) Yet the district court determined: "There was no problem when the officers parked
their patrol vehicle and went over to talk to the defendant at the car wash. Within less than a
minute, the officers learned that the defendant was on parole." (R., p.70.) However, under the
circumstances here, the officers seized Mr. Nelson at the start of their interaction with him,
before they learned he was on parole.

Reasonable articulable suspicion did not support the

officers' warrantless seizure of Mr. Nelson. The evidence obtained as a result of the unlawful
seizure must be suppressed.

B.

The Officers Seized Mr. Nelson At The Start Of Their Interaction With Him, Before
They Learned He Was On Parole
Mr. Nelson asserts the officers seized him at the start of their interaction, before the

officers learned he was on parole. An examination of all the circumstances surrounding the
incident demonstrates that a reasonable person in Mr. Nelson's situation would have believed he
was not free to leave. See Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 574 (1988). Specifically, the
two uniformed officers confronted Mr. Nelson in the early morning hours; the other officer's
hand was near his weapon holster; and the lead officer almost immediately began questioning
Mr. Nelson, the questions implying that the lead officer thought Mr. Nelson was involved in
suspicious or criminal activity. (See De£ Ex. A, 00:00-00:57.)
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The State argues, "There was nothing that would have suggested to a reasonable person
that he was not free to decline to answer [the officers' questions] and leave." (Resp. Br., p.8.)
The State bases this proposition on the following: the officers had not activated their patrol car's
lights and sirens; they parked their patrol car and approached Mr. Nelson so as to not block him
from leaving; they did not draw their weapons, physically touch Mr. Nelson, or give him any
orders; and they used a casual, conversational tone. (See Resp. Br., p.7.)
Next, the State contends, with respect to the circumstances emphasized by Mr. Nelson:
"Individually or collectively, those factors would not suggest to a reasonable person that they
could not leave." (See Resp. Br., p.8.) The flaw with the State's argument is that it only
proceeds to address each of those factors (the time of the incident, the presence of two officers,
the other officer's hand being near his weapon holster, and the nature of the lead officer's
questions) individually. (See Resp. Br., pp.8-10.) However, the test for determining whether a
person has been "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment "provides that the police
can be said to have seized an individual 'only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding
the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave."'

Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 574 quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)).
When considering all the circumstances here, a reasonable person in Mr. Nelson's position
would not have felt free to disregard questions to him about suspicious or criminal activity, asked
by one of two uniformed officers during an early morning interaction. See Florida v. Bostick,
501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991).
A comparison of the circumstances in this case with the circumstances in some of the
cases cited by the State supports this conclusion. (See Resp. Br., pp.7-9.) For example, the lead
officer here asked Mr. Nelson where he lived, and ifhe had ever been arrested. (See Def Ex. A,
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00:45-00:57.) Those questions, coupled with the lead officer's previous question on whether the
car was registered to Mr. Nelson, implied the lead officer thought Mr. Nelson was involved in
suspicious or criminal activity. In contrast, the officers in State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841 (2004),
and State v. Pieper, 163 Idaho 732 (Ct. App. 2018), did not ask such questions of the respective
defendants in those cases. See Page, 140 Idaho at 842-43; Pieper, 163 Idaho at 733. Rather, the
officer in Page asked if he could talk to the defendant for a moment, inquired about his wellbeing, and then asked him for some identification. See Page, 140 Idaho at 843. Similarly, an
officer in Pieper asked, "Can I talk to you guys," before another officer saw contraband in plain
view in the defendant's car. See Pieper, 163 Idaho at 733. Unlike the questions posed in Page
and Pieper, the lead officer's inquiries in the instant case implied that the officer thought
Mr. Nelson was involved in suspicious or criminal activity. Further, the lead officer here did not
even open by asking Mr. Nelson ifhe would be willing to answer some questions. (See Def Ex.
A, 00: 30-00:40.)
Additionally, in Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016), the United States Supreme Court
observed in an attenuation doctrine context that an officer, instead of unlawfully stopping the
defendant, could have asked the defendant if he would speak with him, and ask what was going
on in the suspected drug house the officer had seen him enter.

Id. at 2063.

The line of

questioning the Striejf Court endorsed is readily distinguishable from the questions here, which
implied the lead officer thought Mr. Nelson was involved in suspicious or criminal activity.
The State's argument improperly addresses the relevant circumstances individually,
rather than examine all of the circumstances surrounding the incident. An examination of all the
circumstances demonstrates that a reasonable person in Mr. Nelson's situation would have
believed he was not free to leave. Because a reasonable person would have believed they were
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not free to leave under the totality of the circumstances, and Mr. Nelson yielded to the officers'
show of authority (see Def Ex. A, 00:35-01:20), the officers seized Mr. Nelson at the start of
their interaction, before the officers learned he was on parole. See Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 574.

C.

Reasonable Articulable Suspicion Did Not Support The Officers' Warrantless Seizure Of
Mr. Nelson, And The Evidence Obtained As A Result Of The Unlawful Seizure Must Be
Suppressed
Mr. Nelson asserts reasonable articulable susp1c1on did not support the officers'

warrantless seizure here. See State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811 (2009). He further asserts the
evidence obtained as a result of the officers' unlawful seizure must be suppressed. See id.
The State restricts its argument on appeal to the contention that the incident was a
consensual encounter, not a seizure. (See Resp. Br., pp.5-10.) Because the State does not argue
that reasonable articulable suspicion supported the warrantless seizure, nor do they argue that the
evidence obtained should not suppressed, any future arguments by the State on those points
should be disregarded. See State v. Almarez, 154 Idaho 584, 598-99 (2013). The district court
erred when it denied Mr. Nelson's motion to suppress.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, as well as the reasons contained in the Appellant's Brief,
Mr. Nelson respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order of judgment and
commitment and reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress.
DATED this 8th day of April, 2020.

Isl Ben P. McGreevy
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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